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Abstract : Law of the Republic of Indonesia on the State Defense stipulates among others: the active 
role of the Army in maintaining regional and international peace, defense diplomacy, as well as 
incorporating people and other resources in defending the country. The inauspicious Indonesian 
defense diplomacy towards Singapore in the form of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 2007 
planned to beef up both military cooperation and mutual confidence. The planned joint training 
would exploit not only Indonesian territories, but also affect people's livelihood and safety. Utilizing 
people in the implementation exposes loopholes in the regulation(s) of the state defense. Should 
government consult the concerned people? Indeed, people were not consulted as the existing 
regulations sidestep people in the process to reach an agreement in DCA. And that is one of the case of 
neglecting people interest in the reformasi era!
Keywords: Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) Indonesia-Singapore, defense diplomacy, 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) (Indonesian National Armed Forces), people (rakyat), reformasi, 
State Defense.
Abstrak: Hukum Republik Indonesia di dalam pertahanan Negara merupkan keharusan: peranan 
aktif dari Tentara dalam menjaga kedamaian regional dan Internasional, diplomasi pertahanan, rakyat 
dan sumber lainnya bekerja sama dalam mempertahankan Negara. Kesialan diplomasi pertahanan 
Indonesia terhadap Singapura di dalam Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) tahun 2007 dibentuk 
untuk protes terhadap kerjasama militer dan kemampuan kedua pihak. Rencana untuk latihan 
bersama tidak hanya dapat mengeksploitasi wilayah Indonesia, tetapi juga mempengaruhi kehidupan 
dan keamanan rakyat. Menggunakan rakyat dalam pengimplementasian memperlihatkan bagaimana 
caranya keluar dari regulasi-regulasi dalam mempertahankan Negara. Haruskah pemerintah 
mendiskusiakan dengan raktyat?. Tentu saja, karena rakyat bukanlah sebagai langkah dalam 
pembentukkan regulasi dalam proses untuk mencapai kesepakatan di dalam DCA. Dan itu adalah 
salah satu kasus dari pengabaian rakyat di era Reformasi.
Kata Kunci: Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), Indonesia-Singapura, Diplomasi Pertahanan, 
tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)(Indonesian national Armed Forces), Rakyat, Reformasi, State 
Defense.
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Considerations for the decree of the Law No. 3 
of 2002 on the State Defense points b,c and d 
stipulate:
b. That national defense is one of the 
functions of state government in an 
effort to realize unity in the state 
defense to reach national objectives, 
namely protecting the nation and 
Indonesia's birthplace, promoting 
welfare, improving the life of the 
nation, and participating in carrying out 
world order based on freedom, eternal 
peace, and social justice;
c. That in managing state defense, every 
single citizen has the rights and 
obligations to participate in defending 
the state as a reflection of the life of the 
nation that guarantees the rights of 
people to live equally, just, safe, peace, 
and well;
d. That effort to defend the state is carried 
out  by creat ing,  maintaining,  
developing, and applying the state 
defense forces based on democracy, 
human rights, welfare, environment, 
national legal provision, international 
law and conventions, as well as the 
principles of peaceful co-existence.
The above points are elaborated in the 
Law and become the basis in organizing the 
national defense. They indicate that the 
Indonesian national defense contains the 
universal values of democracy and human 
rights.
Some basic problems persist in 
practice. State defense system, as elaborated 
in the Law, is the effort to defend the security 
27 of the people.  It is the system of defense that 
is total in nature, incorporates the whole 
citizens, territory, and other national 
28resources.  Nevertheless, there is a gap 
between theory and practice: Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between 
Indonesia and Singapore in 2007, supposed it 
was carried out, would not guarantee that 
[local] people would feel safe and peaceful. 
More than anything else, it would exploit 
people's territories without consulting them in 
advance of the signing of the Agreement.
This essay showcases how the 
government's thinking about defense policy 
and the people's interests do not converge. 
What government thinks as strategic and 
beneficial goes against the people's will, and 
even harmful to the people. After reformasi 
goes for more than a decade, sidestepping or 
neglecting people reflects the wider 
government's attitude towards people.
The Case of DCA
thDCA was signed on April 27 , 2007. 
Previous to the signing, both countries had 
committed to negotiate a DCA in parallel with 
an Extradition Treaty (ET), and to conclude 
both agreements together as one package. The 
DCA was intended to enhance and strengthen 
the existing bilateral relations between the 
two armed forces through mutually beneficial 
cooperative activities. Furthermore, it 
provided a comprehensive strategic 
framework for promoting bilateral defense 
27 Chapter 1 clause 1.
28 Chapter 1 clause 2.
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cooperation to enhance the professionalism 
and inter-operability of the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia — TNI) and the Singaporean Armed 
Forces (SAF) through a greater mutual access 
towards each other's training areas and 
facilities. It is meant that the Singaporean 
would provide the training assistance to the 
TNI, and the Indonesian would allow the use 
of the training areas for the SAF. The 
cooperations also included the restoration and 
maintenance of the training facilities, and the 
29use of certain military instruments.
The agreement was intended to dispel 
suspicion and hostility grew during the 
reformasi era in Indonesia. The areas of 
 30cooperation are:
1. The restoration and maintenance of the 
infrastructure and instrumentation for 
an Air Combat Maneuvering Range in 
Pekanbaru in Sumatra, which would be 
used for air combat and intercept 
training by aircraft from both air 
forces;
2. The restoration and maintenance of an 
Air Weapons Range in Pekanbaru in 
Sumatra, which would be used for air-
to-ground weapons training by aircraft 
from both air forces;
3. The provision of a Naval Gunfire 
Support Scoring System to be used at 
Pulau Kayu Ara, which would allow 
ships from both navies to conduct naval 
gun firing exercises;
4. The provision of naval technical 
assistance and access to naval training 
facilities;
5. The development of Baturaja Land 
Forces Training Area in Sumatra, as 
well as the construction of the 
necessary infrastructure, to support 
army training by both countries;
6. The continued training assistance 
provided by the SAF to the TNI in the 
areas of simulator training and 
academic courses.
The areas of deep cooperation, where some 
points were considered as compromising 
state's sovereignty — would allay suspicion 
and resentment and, expectedly ensued with 
warmer relations. In strategic terms, the 
29 See further the MINDEF Singapore , 2007, 
accessed in 11 August 2011.
30 Ibid., accessed in 15 August 2011.
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agreement would bring advantage to both 
countries. 
The advantage was looming large as the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan 
both show uncertainties in regards to their 
future roles (whether benign or malign) in the 
region. Furthermore, their relationship as 
major powers would affect the whole region 
positively or negatively. Also, the future 
commitment of the United States puzzles the 
region. Washington sometimes puts this 
region as a priority, but sometimes it seems to 
leave the region and then concentrating on 
another region in the world. Even on certain 
issues, such as human rights, Washington 
shows animosi ty,  undermining the 
31relationships within the region.
Hopefully, the Agreement would help to 
meet the needs of Indonesia [and Singapore] 
in facing the uncertainty in the region. From 
the Indonesian side, in the post-Suharto era, 
the TNI experiences low morale. Due to the 
previous U.S. embargo, it badly needs new 
instruments, because most of them are 
32obsolete.  The cooperation would alleviate 
the dire situations of the Indonesian military. 
It was expected that joint training with 
Singaporean military would expose the TNI to 
sophisticated and state-of-the-art military 
technologies. As it would enable mutual visits 
of military vehicles of both countries during 
the exercises or other activities, in strategic 
terms, the Agreement contained confidence 
and security-building measures — by allaying 
suspicion and resentment. Ultimately, it 
would contribute to security and stability in 
Southeast Asia.
Defense diplomacy is relatively a new 
concept, though it has been practiced by many 
 33countries. Essentially, it is a diplomacy with 
military-related issues at the top of the agenda 
and conducted by at least two states. More 
systematic and clearer concept of defense 
31   See also Harsawaskita, 2010.
32  Chapter 7 Presidential Decree no. 7 of 2005 on 
the Medium Term National Development Plan 
admits the dire situations of the Indonesian 
Army.
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33 For instance, by Japan, see Garren Mulloy (2007) 
“Japan's Defense Diplomacy and 'Cold Peace' in 
Asia” in Asia Journal of Global Studies, vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 2-14;by China since 1990s, see Kristen 
Gunnes (2006) “China's Military Diplomacy in 
an Era of Change,” paper for the National 
Defense University symposium on China's 
Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security 
Interests; by Soviet Union, see Dan L. Strode & 
Rebecca V. Strode (1983) “Diplomacy and 
Defense in Soviet National Security Policy” in 
International Security, Fall, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 91-
116; U.S has conducted defense diplomacy 
towards Brazil since 1930s, see Daniel Zirker 
(2008) “Defining a US Defense Diplomacy for 
Brazil at the Beginning of the Century,” paper for 
the Second Annual Meeting of the Associação 
Brasileira de Estudos da Defesa, July.
diplomacy was provided by the British, as 
mentioned in the Strategic Defence Review of 
1998. Defense diplomacy was intended to 
integrate better the military and diplomatic 
tools to prevent conflicts or to manage crises. 
Originally, it was defined as follows:
“To provide forces to meet the varied 
activities undertaken by the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD) to dispel hostility, 
build and maintain trust and assist in 
the development of democratically 
accountable armed forces, thereby 
making a significant contribution to 
34conflict prevention and resolution.”
Cottey and Forster add to the concept 
on the use of armed forces as well as the 
infrastructure and instrument that support 
defense and foreign policy. It is executed in 
the form of defense cooperation and 
assistance. They emphasize that defense 
diplomacy is no longer a means of 
strengthening allies' defence capabilities, but 
rather as an instrument for building 
cooperative relations with former or potential 
adversaries, and thereby help to prevent 
35potential conflicts.
Examining the details of the DCA, the 
agreement could be viewed as a “defense 
diplomacy”. In the agreement, it is stated that 
the SAF provides training assistance to the 
TNI. And it was stated clearly that both are to 
conduct naval exercises. As both has greater 
mutual access to each other's training areas 
and facilities, the increasing interoperability 
of the TNI and SAF is obvious. Also, it was a 
confidence-building measure between the two 
countries that previously shared mutual 
suspicion. This is the ultimate goal of security 
cooperation, as illustrated in the post-Cold 
War Europe.
But as happened in other [political] 
cases in Indonesia, events in the public sphere 
do not reflect the wider public interests. The 
seemingly beneficial agreement to the state 
ignited uproar in public, especially in the areas 
concerned. To cater for the Indonesian and 
Singaporean army training, both countries 
agreed to develop the Baturaja Land Forces 
Tra in ing  Area  wi th  i t s  necessa ry  
infrastructures. It is located in the regency of 
Ogan Komering Ulu (OKU), in the province 
of South Sumatra. Unfortunately, people in 
the concerned area were not consulted in 
advance.
 34 Ministry of Defence Policy Paper, p. 2.
35 Cottey & Forster, 2004: 15.
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The locals resented the idea of 
cooperation and mentioned the Indonesia's 
interest.They deemed Indonesia got 
disadvantage. Locals added that farmers were 
afraid to go to work if the forests in OKU 
became the training area or war simulation 
area. As the local government had not been 
consulted prior to the signing and during the 
negotiations, the Vice Regent of OKU, Yulius 
Nawawi, reminded the danger of strayed 
bullets, or landmines and explosives. He 
called attention to the fact that there are still 
remain the leftover explosive from the Dutch 
and the Japanese from the war of 
independence. These remnant poses threat  
for the people even though the war was over 
more than six decades ago. He suggested 
Jakarta to use other areas such as the remote 
islands.
The people and the local government  
of Natuna, Riau Islands shared the 
36apprehension.  As they were not consulted 
before the signing and negotiations, they did 
not know the exact location for the joint 
military training as mentioned in the 
agreement. The fishermen in Riau were afraid 
of mines and other explosives as the DCA 
mentioned two military training areas 
(MTAs). MTA I covered the area in Pangkal 
Pinang. MTA II covered the area around 
Natuna and South Natuna. The Vice Speaker 
of Regional Parliament of Riau Islands, J. 
Nadeak, asked Jakarta to inform the local 
government. They needed the information as 
the local government and the regional 
parliament planned to socialize the public 
about the situation. The locals did not know 
the whereabout of the training areas, 
especially those areas that are located in the 
waters. For the fishermen, it is important to 
know the exact location and the schedule of 
the training.
It was not just the people, but also the 
political elite that were not properly informed 
by the government. The DCA was barely one-
month old, and the parliament in Jakarta 
voiced their resentment about the contents of 
the agreement. They accused the government 
has given up sovereignty by allowing the 
Singaporean to use the Indonesian territories. 
They also raised the issue of environmental 
damage due to the development of the military 
36The people of Natuna threatened to occupy the 
Palace in Jakarta if the Agreement was follow 
through. The Regent of Natuna, Daeng Rusnadi, 
also pointed out that some of the areas concerned 
are transportation line and sites of natural gas 
resource. See further in ANTARA News, 2007.
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facilities. Some even asked to abrogate the 
treaty. And representing the people's anger, 
the Regional Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah — DPRD) of OKU gave the 
37final blow by voting against the DCA.        
The decision became a reflection of how the 
local people felt: they were left behind by the 
central government in discussing matters that 
has direct correlation of their interests.
The Case of Neglecting People's Interest
DCA was signed with the Extradition 
Treaty in parallel. This essay does not discuss 
as why both were signed or negotiated in 
parallel. It also does not elaborate the military-
related nature of the DCA. This essay accepts 
the DCA from the Indonesian perspective as a 
state-to-state cooperation. It is a logical option 
state chooses to cooperate with its neighbour 
against the background of the uncertainty in 
the region, and the state of its military. As a 
defense diplomacy, it was strategic in the 
sense that it built confidence with the 
neighboring country. In a legalistic manner, it 
is an exercise of the government's authority 
regarding defense.
Where are the people in this defense 
equation?
First of all, reformasi brought about 
changes to many elements of the Indonesian 
political system. In regards to defense, the 
changes were formalized in the Law No. 3 of 
2002 on the State Defense. Article 16 point 4 
confides the Minister to write a defense white 
paper and authorizes policy of bilateral, 
regional, and international cooperations in 
his/her responsibility. It means the Law does 
allow the Minister to conduct international 
cooperation. International cooperations are 
elaborated further in the Chapter 7 
Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2005 on the 
Medium-Term National Development Plan. 
The so-called “International Military 
Cooperation Program” is aimed to increase 
military cooperation with friendly countries in 
order to create regional and international 
security, and to improve international 
relationships. The chapter does mention 
among others the defense cooperation with 
Singapore and the agreement on the Military 
Training Area (MTA).
One year after the DCA was abrogated, 
the government issued the Presidential 
Provision No. 7 of 2008 on the General Policy 37 Wijaya, 2007.
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of State Defense. It stipulates that  
cooperation in the defense affairs is part of 
foreign policy, and is not leading to Defense 
Pact. The cooperation is in the context of 
strengthening, as well as deploying and 
employing power. Furthermore, it mentions 
the priority to employ home-made product. 
Also, the deployment and employment 
powers in the international defense 
cooperation are part of the effort to build 
confidence and diplomacy, and to collectively 
solve security problem.
Based on the above Presidential 
Provision of 2008, defense diplomacy is an 
international defense cooperation to increase 
military cooperation with friendly countries in 
order to create regional and international 
security and to improve international 
relationships. Unfortunately, as the concept is 
originated from the Western military thinking, 
it misses the context of the “people.” In the 
Western context during the wartime, let alone 
the peacetime, the people (but the conscripts) 
are not involved. Here, the DCA as a defense 
diplomacy faced a theoretical problem 
because it was not only the military who 
became the stakeholder, but also people and 
their interest.
Additionally, what happened to the 
people in the case of DCA of 2007 was the 
divorcement of the people from the issue that 
concerned them. It was an illustrative example 
of the excessive interpretation of the Law on 
the Regional Autonomy. Clause 7 point 1 
stipulates that the regional government has no 
authority in foreign policy, as well as defense 
and security policy. It grants the government 
38  the monopoly to manage its defense affairs.
It means Jakarta defines nationally what is 
good for creating peaceful environment for 
the whole Indonesia, not based on the local 
context.
DCA as a defense diplomacy should be 
examined further: (a) it is a state-to-state 
agreement signed by the government; but (b) 
it would utilize certain areas belong to the 
local people, and they are, possibly, not owned 
by the state or the military. Point (a) is based 
on clause 7 point 1, meanwhile point (b) has 
the potential for colliding with clause 10 that 
stipulates the authority of the regional 
government in managing national resources, 
as well as supporting law and sovereignty 
38 Both Laws distinguish central and regional 
governments as “government” and “regional 
government” respectively.
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enforcements. A careful read on the clause 13 
point 1, it stipulates that government could 
delegate certain assignments to the regional 
government in support of the government 
decree.
DCA was signed between two countries 
as defense matter. But consistent with the Law 
on Regional Autonomy, the government 
should not have done a fait accompli to the 
regional government or to the people 
concerned. Interpreting the clause 10, the 
regional government should have had a say in 
the negotiations. This could have been a 
lengthy negotiations, involving not only two 
countries but also local government. 
Moreover, Indonesia adheres to the total 
defense. It incorporates the whole citizens and 
territory; people are part of the defense 
system, namely the system of people's total 
defense and security (sistem pertahanan 
keamanan rakyat semesta — sishankamrata). 
I t  m e a n s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d  
accommodate people to voice their interest in 
the first place.
How are the people neglected?
It begins with education. Through the 
subject of the Indonesian history, students are 
inculcated with the epic story of the 
Indonesian guerilla armed with sharpened 
bamboo confronting the Dutch colonial 
power. The struggle was made possible by the 
support of grassroots or small people 
(wongcilik). It is said, the guerilla and the 
people fought side by side for their 
independence. The history seemingly moves 
from the Independence Day in August 1945 to 
the Suharto presidency. The years in between 
are sketchy and debatable, even the 
interpretations regarding that period are 
inconclusive. The official history highlights 
the importance of the failed putsch by the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965 
but blurs the ensuing purge of its members  
 39that took hundred thousand lives.         
Suharto and the army were the winners in the 
40 official history. It seems the history 
authorized them to rule the country. And who 
were the losers?
Sukarno and his followers were clearly 
the losers. Sukarno and Sukarnoism got a bad 
39 Read further in John Roosa (2006) Pretext for 
Mass Murder: The September 20th Movement 
and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia, 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
40 See further in M.C. Ricklefs (2001) A History of 
Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, third edition, 
Hampshire: PALGRAVE, pp. 342-365.
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44by the fact that since 1950  until the second 
decade of the 21st century, violent disputes 
occurred between the military and the local 
people. The disputes concerned on the land 
possessions: the military claimed the disputed 
land is for their quarter or training facilities; 
meanwhile the local people claimed that they 
are the inheritor. The military accused the 
people plundered and occupied land that 
belongs to the military since 1950s; the people 
accused the military grabbed the land they till 
for generations. Thus, “defending people” 
could not be taken for granted for the military. 
It seems that the military do a double standard 
in understanding the notion: when it comes to 
military-related affairs, the military must 
defend the country and the people; but when it 
comes to their interests, the people are 
secondary, even not to be taken into account.
For instance, one month after the 
signing of the DCA the violent brawl occurred 
in Alas Tlogo, East Java, between the local 
people and the Marine. The causes of the 
clashes were the land disputes and the use of 
45land for other purposes than military.           
41name, identical with the PKI followers.  
Almost forgotten, the purge of the PKI was 
followed by victimizing the victims. As the 
PKI always claimed themselves as the 
42defender of the people,   “defending people” 
is considered as left-leaning political agenda 
or action. And in a country that considered 
everybody has to embrace a religion, left-
43 leaning attitude is deemed as atheism.
“Defending people” or populism, except 
committed by the government, is a risky 
business. Many times, during the Suharto era, 
defending workers, farmers, or victims of 
eviction, were easily labeled as “PKI cadres.” 
This originates the powerlessness of the 
people vis-á-vis the state and its apparatuses.
Thus, “defending people” contains two 
connotations: first, it connotates “left-
leaning” orientation, as inherited from the 
Orde Baru; second, “defending people” as the 
sacred duty of the defense system.             
The conflicting connotations are complicated 
41 Read further in Rex Mortimer (1974 & 2006) 
Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: 
Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, Jakarta: 
Equinox Publishing.
42 Ibid.
43 See also I Gusti Agung Ayu Ratih (1997) 
Suharto's New Order State: Imposed Ilusions 
and Invented Legitimation, final paper for 
Master of Arts in Southeast Asian Studies-
History, Madison: University of Wisconsin.
44 The imposition of Emergency Law of 1950 no. 8 
clause 1 about the take-over of the land for the 
state defense.
45  Pramodhawardani, 2011.
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In the area proposed for the military training, 
the Marine and a state company, PT Rajawali 
Nusantara Indonesia (RNI), cultivate the land 
46for sugarcane.  Though the DCA and the 
Atlas Tlogo affair were not related, the latter 
case showcases how the government views 
the people in regards to the military-related 
(read: defense) affairs. People would be 
subordinated at all cost though the national 
defense contains the universal values of 
democracy and human rights. The interest of 
the unit prevails upon the interest of the 
people. It is ironic that the Law No. 34 of 2004 
regarding the TNI, Chapter II on Self-Identity, 
point c and d do stipulate that the Indonesian 
National Army are:
c. National Army, namely the army of the 
Indonesian nation, that serves for the 
interests of the state above the interests 
of provinciality, ethnicity, racial, and 
religion.
d. Professional Army, namely a trained, 
educated, well-equipped, apolitical 
soldier, not involved in business 
activity, guaranteed prosperity, and 
following the policy of the state that 
adheres to the principles of democracy, 
civilian supremacy, human rights, 
national legal provision, and the ratified 
international law.
The powerlessness of the people is 
sustained by the law.The basic law underpins 
the Indonesian defense system is 1945 
Constitution, Chapter XII entitled “Defense 
and Security of the State.” Article 30 point 1 
does stipulate the rights and obligations of 
every single citizen to participate in the effort 
of defending and securing the state. Point 2 
stipulates about implementing a system of 
defense and security by the TNI and the  
Police as the backbones, and people as the 
supporting forces. The same article point 5 
stipulates among others the requirements for 
participating in the effort of defending and 
securing the state, as well as matters 
concerning defense and security would be 
regulated by the Law. Here, the Constitution 
has opened the possibility to elaborate what 
constitutes as people participation in defense 
and security.
46 In 1960, the Indonesian Korps Komando 
Angkatan Laut (KKO-AL), the Marine, forced 
the local people to turn over the land to them to 
be developed as an airstrip. During the Suharto 
era, it became the land under cultivation. 
Officially, the land was managed by Central 
Cooperative – Navy (Pusat Koperasi Angkatan 
Laut (Puskopal)), in this instance was Yayasan 
Sosial Bhumyamca (Yasbhum). They were part 
of the military business then. See further TPF 
Independen Alas Tlogo (2007).
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The article 30 above was a product of 
reformasi, the amendment of the Constitution. 
It is a reflection of the people's will as decreed 
by the Resolution of the People's Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR)) No. VI of 2000 on the separation of 
the TNI and the Police and the Resolution of 
the People's Consultative Assembly No. VII 
of 2000 on the Role of the TNI and the Role of 
the Police. To put things into gear, the 
government issued the Law No. 3 of 2002 on 
the State Defense, replacing the Law No. 20 of 
1982. Law of 2002 regulates the authority and 
responsibilities of the Minister of  Defense, 
the roles and duty of the TNI, the authority and 
responsibilities of the Chief of the TNI, 
democratic values, human rights, and 
environment as the principles, roles of the 
Parliament in the state defense, and rights and 
obligations of the citizen in defending the 
47state.
The involvement of the people in 
defending the state against the military threat, 
as part of the Sishankamrata, is defined in the 
Law of 2002. It is categorized further as 
reserve and supporting components 
–including natural resources, artificial 
resources, as well as equipment and 
infrastructure. Here, the people are paralleled 
with non-human elements. The reserve 
components are prepared to be deployed by 
means of mobilization for enlarging and 
strengthening the main component, the TNI. 
And the supporting components are prepared 
to increase the strength and capability of the 
main and supporting components. Do those 
components need regulation(s)?.
Sishankamrata has the probability to 
collide with the Geneva Convention as people 
is drawn into military conflict. In the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Convention of 
thAugust 12 ,1949; and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 44 on 
Combatants and prisoners of war point 3, 
stipulates that “In order to promote the 
protection of the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged 
to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population ....” However, the founding fathers 
of the Indonesian state defense learned       
and formed the system based on the 
47Articles 16 on minister of defense; article 10 on 
the TNI; article 18 on the chief of the TNI; articles 
3 on the principles; chapter 6 on the parliament; 
article 9 point 1 and 2 concerns the citizens.
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experience during the war of independence: 
deep cooperation between the army and the 
people. To clarify the possible conflicting 
interpretations, the involvement of the people 
should be clarified and regulated.
Reformasi moves at slow pace in 
clarifying and regulating security sector, 
especially regarding the role of the people. It 
fulfilled first the separation of the police from 
the army in 2000. In October 2011 came next: 
the Parliament passed the Law regarding the 
State Intelligence. Though the human rights 
activists criticize the law as still containing the 
possible human rights violations in the 
provisions, such as tapping authority, money-
flow auditing, and in-depth interrogation, the 
goals to develop and to support the democratic 
values partially fulfilled in spite of the 
shortcomings in the details. On the other hand, 
the regulation regarding the place of people in 
the defense system has not finished yet. The 
so-called “Reserve Components” bill is still 
under intense debate, and the on-and-off 
public debates do not create a conducive 
climate for a constructive development.
The DCA imbroglio in fact opened the 
issue of people and their interests. 
Unfortunately, the debates about the Bill do 
not touch those issues. The Bill debates 
hovered over the needs of the reserve 
components in the near future and over what 
kind of reserve component whether 
conscription or voluntary service. Some 
doubts about the importance of the reserve 
component as the threat of war receded and 
Indonesia faces severe low budget, including 
the defense budget, and there are other bills 
more worthy attention. Polemics regarding 
the reserve or supporting components hovered 
around people in the military service. People, 
as part of state defense, are stipulated in the 
48Bill in the article 1 point 3, article 3 , article 6 
point 1a, and article 9. All refers to human 
resources in the military context.
Further information worth to be 
mentioned is that the polemics regarding the 
reserve components was not commenced 
during the DCA negotiations and the ensuing 
debates on the Agreement. The debate did 
commence after the DCA abrogated, and the 
debate was not related to the people and their 
interests (that is, the areas concerned and their 
48 The article stipulates that Reserve Components 
are an association and a form of participation of 
the citizens, whole natural and artificial 
resources, as well as equipment and 
infrastructure in the effort to defend the state.
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livelihoods). Not with standing the fact that 
the DCA did contain the reserve components, 
particularly article 6 point 1b regarding the 
natural resources; and article 4 stipulates that 
the components are utilized during the 
training and mobilization only.
The utilization of the non-human 
components is elaborated further in the 
chapter 3 entitled “Decree and the Use of 
Natural and Artificial Resources, Equipment 
and Infrastructure as Reserve Components.” 
Article 14 point 3 does stipulate among others 
the owner, the manager, and the responsible 
party of the Natural Resources, Artificial 
Resources, Equipment and Infrastructure. 
Therefore, if Jakarta had been serious about 
the utilization of the local areas (during the 
training), Jakarta would have raised the 
importance of the Bill as it regulates the 
utilization of the non-human aspects of the 
reserves.
And the fact is that the debates never 
touch the non-human components of the 
Reserve Components. Instead, the Ministry of 
Defense urged Parliament to approve the 
Reserve Components Bill in order to have 
about 50 thousand conscripts in the next five 
years. This is the point that we have to 
scrutinize: the Reserve Components of State 
Defense was drafted by the Ministry of 
Defense at the end of 2006, even the principal 
49    part had been drawn up by March 2003.
Vice Admiral Leonardi, the General Director 
of the Defense Potential of the Ministry of 
Defense, added the Ministry's position by 
asserting the mobilization nature of the Bill, 
mentioning that the reservists would receive 
training. This underlined the importance of 
militarization of certain sector of the society. 
That is why the ensuing polemic hovered 
around the potential of human rights 
violations, and even the divide-and-rule 
policy towards the people.
Leonardi's comment heightened the 
debate. He focused the Bill as the regulation 
regarding the use of people only in the 
military. His comment concealed other 
ingredients of the reserve components, 
namely non-human resources components, as 
stipulated in the article 6 point 1. It is a big 
question mark why during the debate 
regarding the DCA and after the agreement 
was abrogated, nobody raised the importance 
of this controversial bill in relation to the   
49 hukumonline.com, Friday, 20 February 2009.
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non-human resources  components .             
The DCA itself did not contain “people,” but it 
was obvious that it contained the “interest of 
the people,” namely their property and their 
livelihood.
One with a good grasp of Indonesian 
politics could sense a curious phenomenon 
here. “For the people” always becomes the 
mantra to legitimize policy, including defense 
policy. The mantra guarantees the support 
from the public. But curiously, this mantra 
was omitted in the defense diplomacy that 
intensively exploited lands. For the record, 
since the release of the Indonesian Defense 
White Paper of 2003 to the DCA, Indonesia 
had conducted 60 defense cooperations with 
50other countries.   None bar the joint training 
with the United States in March 2006 in the 
Sulawesi waters, exploited the Indonesian 
territory intensively, and directly affected the 
people, like the proposed DCA. So, if the 
government and the political elite are serious 
about protecting the people's interests, they 
should raise and discuss publicly about the 
Reserve Components Bill, prioritize the 
issues of non-human components, and 
downplay the human component as the 
militarized actor!.
Concluding Remarks
Defense policy focuses on how the state 
prepares for countering threat(s). The 
preparations include military-related or 
military preparedness, providing laws 
regarding the state defense, as well as 
preparing society, along with the people and 
their environment to face the worst-case 
scenario, that is armed conflict. Those 
preparations are one of the duties that 
government must perform for its people to 
ensure their security.
The Indonesian defense planners, as 
other governments do, prepares the state 
defense militarily and legally. And learning 
from the struggle for independence, they 
incorporate people and their environment in 
the so-called Sishankamrata. It is a total 
defense in practice, preparing the Army and 
the people to counter the military threat. In 
any case, the regulations regarding the 
i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  t h e  n o n - m i l i t a r y  
component(s) in the defense system were not 
clear-cut. Luckily, Indonesia never needed to 
50 Syawfi, 2009.
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put the system into service in the post-
independence years.
As reformasi  wishes to have 
everything in order and democratic, 
development in the security sector reform has 
not yet fulfilled the agenda of reformasi: 
currently, government and the parliament 
passed the controversial bill (the Law on the 
State Intelligence) and put forward the other 
controversial one (the Reserve Components 
Bill). Not until the latter Bill created uproar 
did it occur to me that DCA of 2007 was 
virtually connected. The DCA exposed the 
confusion in regulating the place of people 
and their interests in the defense policy. The 
people and their environment in the state 
defense are regulated in the Reserve 
Components Bill as human and non-human 
components.
Connecting them exposed many 
contradictions: first, regulation related to 
international defense cooperation does not 
mention or link the people or their 
involvement or their environment, though 
they are part of Sishankamrata; second, 
potential ill effect to society emanated from 
the cooperation contradicted the [beneficial] 
cooperation; third, this (supposedly 
democratic and legitimate) government is not 
sincere to its society, as seen from fourth, the 
more relevant issue was downplayed, and the 
polemic was led to the less relevant issue. All 
things considered, raising the less relevant to 
the more relevant issue parades a case of 
neglect of wider interest, namely public or 
people's interests.
Developments in the security sector, 
including defense policy, become the 
antithesis of reformasi. Reformasi as a 
political development and a new chapter in the 
Indonesian history has made the political 
participation increased through elections and 
open public voice. People can control the 
government behavior, as never been before. 
But reformasi and development in defense 
issues drift apart. In spite of democratization, 
and Sishankamrata, in regards to defense 
matters, people are isolated. Bear in mind 
Sishankamrata, the increased opportunities to 
participate in the election and to voice their 
preference stops dead when it comes to 
defense matters.
Back to the big picture of reformasi. A 
well-functioning democracy requires an 
116 Adrianus Harsawaskita People's Interests, The Neglected Feature of The Reformasi. The Case of Indonesian Defense Diplomacy
ability to publicly debate and disagree— 
important matters of state. It assumes a 
common understanding of citizen's right and 
responsibility. In a wider context, in a 
democracy the mantra is “for the people,” the 
p o l i c y  d e d i c a t e s  t o  t h e  p e o p l e .  
Inappropriately, in the Indonesian political 
context, this phrase becomes an empty mantra 
or just a slogan; in practice it becomes an 
alien.That empty slogan adds to a grim fact: 
facing endemic corruption and other 
persistent problems in the country, people feel 
that the state no longer exists to help, guard, or 
protect them. It is a big question mark, then, 
whether the defense policy is a policy for 
defending the people and the country.
DCA is an inseparable from other cases 
in Indonesia. It is a model for other cases that 
neglect people, and make use of the people. It 
is said that every policy is for the people, but at 
the end, it neglects people and its environment 
or livelihoods. Moreover, the people have to 
find its own protection or to help themselves 
out of their predicaments.That is why if you 
live in Indonesia nowadays, you are aware of 
the disturbing trend: the erosion of people's 
trust in the government as the state is 
conspicuously absent in matters involving the 
people's predicaments, from traffic jams, 
price hikes, unavailability of the proper 
educations, or the protection of the religious 
minority. It seems that the people are not 
included in the political equation other than 
numbers during the elections. Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, what the government conveys 
regarding, say, corruption eradication is 
responded with skepticism by the public.
Furthermore, in Indonesia, the 
government and the people are two separate 
entities, both are at worlds apart. Both works 
following their own logics. For that reason, 
the policy is not aimed to satisfy people, or to 
fulfill their needs. The output of the political 
system is not people-oriented policy. The 
policy is aimed to aggrandize policy-maker(s) 
and bring advantage to their cronies.The 
people never expect any policy gives them 
refuge, bar it benefits the makers.
In this pasca reformasi, “people-
disorientated” policy is still the name of the 
game!.
117Adrianus Harsawaskita People's Interests, The Neglected Feature of The Reformasi. The Case of Indonesian Defense Diplomacy
Bibliography
“Masyarakat Ancam Duduki Istana Bila Natuna Jadi Tempat Latihan Militer” in ANTARA News, 6 
August 2007. Availble at http://www.antaranews.com/print/72850/pakistan-india-
diplomats-to-meet-in-islamabad, accessed in 11 September 2011.
“RUU Komponen Cadangan Abaikan Prinsip HAM” in hukumonline.com, Friday, 20 February 
2009. Available at www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol2152/ruu-komponen-cadangan-
abaikan-prinsip-ham, accessed in 25 September 2011.
Constitution of 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945).
Cottey, Andrew; and Forster, Anthony. 2004. “Chapter 1: Strategic Engagement: Defense 
Diplomacy as a Means of Conflict Prevention” in Adelphi series, vol. 44, no. 365, pp. 15-30.
Harsawaskita, Adrianus. 2010. “Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy: The Case of Defense Cooperation 
Agreementwith Singapore.” Unpublished research paper during the fellowship in TU 
Dortmund, January-June 2010.
Indonesian Department of Defense. 2003. “INDONESIA: Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki 
Abad 21.” Indonesian Defense White Paper.
Law no. 3 of 2002 on the State Defense (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia nomor3tahun 2002 
tentang Pertahanan Negara).
Law no. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Army (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia nomor 
34 tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia).
MINDEF Singapore (2007, 27 April) “Defence Cooperation Agreement”, available at 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2007/apr/27apr07_nr.html, 
accessed in 11 & 15 August 2011.
Ministry of Defence Policy Paper, Defence Diplomacy, Paper No. 1, London: Ministry of Defence.
Pramodhawardhawardani, Jaleswari. 2011. “Bahaya Laten Sengketa Tanah TNI” in 
KOMPAS.com, 25 April, 03:13 Western Indonesian Time. Available at 
http://www.kompas.com, accessed in 25 September 2011.
Presidential Decree no. 7 of 2005 on the Medium Term National Development Plan, especially 
Chapter 7 “Peningkatan Kemampuan Pertahanan Negara.”
Propatria Institute. 2006.  “Kajian Kritis Paket Perundangan di Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan,” 
Monograph no. 7, Working Group on Security Sector Reform, 12 September.
Reserve Components of State Defense Bill (Rancangan Undang-Undang Komponen Cadangan 
Pertahanan Negara).
Syawfi, Idil. 2009. “Aktifitas Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia dalam Pemenuhan Tujuan-tujuan 
Pertahanan Indonesia (2003-2008).” Unpublished master thesis in the University of 
Indonesia.
TPF Independen Alas Tlogo. 2007. “Laporan Sementara Insiden Alas Tlogo, Lekok, Pasuruan, 6 
Juni 2007.”
Wijaya, Taufik. 2007. “DPRD OKU Tolak DCA RI-Singapura” in detikNews, Thursday, 5 July. 
Available at http://www.detiknews.com/read/2007/07/05/172216/801727/10/dprd-oku-
tolak-dca-ri-singapura, accessed in 11 September 2011.
118 Adrianus Harsawaskita People's Interests, The Neglected Feature of The Reformasi. The Case of Indonesian Defense Diplomacy
